

CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

A Christian Journal of Opinion

Profiles in Power

The extraordinary speech by Senator Eugene McCarthy in nomination of Adlai Stevenson was the high point and most moving moment of the Democratic Convention in Los Angeles. It outshone the more-than-adequate speeches of the nominee and the keynoter, and increased our already great respect for the Minnesota Senator. By calling attention again to the significance of Adlai Stevenson's unusual and important career, it also furnished a backdrop of contrast against which to interpret the events of the convention (world affairs provided another, more somber backdrop).

The contrasts were plain. Where Stevenson had humility or self-deprecation to a fault, Senator Kennedy said forthrightly, after he had been nominated, "I *will* be worthy of that trust. . . ." Where Stevenson and company have regularly been accused of amateurism and ineptitude in political organization, no such charge could be made against the Kennedy forces. Most important, where Adlai Stevenson shunned power, John Kennedy sought it.

It was this last contrast that Senator McCarthy touched on in his forceful speech. Arguing with delegates already committed in great numbers to Senator Kennedy, that they should think again and turn to Mr. Stevenson, he presented his man (rightly, it seems to us) as a kind of "prophet," "one man" speaking out against the complacent materialism of the Eisenhower era, counseling the unheroic virtues such as patience, "talking sense to the American people." Arguing for Stevenson and by implication against Kennedy, Senator McCarthy said that those who seek power are not always those who use it most wisely; that those who do

not seek but are sought out by it might use power more responsibly. It was a strong speech, unusual in party conventions because it was shaped by a conscientious intelligence.

However, one might enter some relevant qualifications to its point. Those who have a deep self-doubt that avoids power may not be the ones to whom to give great executive responsibility; lonely prophets may not make the best politicians or statesmen; and of those who seek power one should still ask: Why? For what use? With what purpose?

Senator Kennedy's attitude toward the nomination contrasted completely with his predecessor's. He wanted it. He sought it. With directness, candor and singleness of purpose he worked for it for four years. Many of the delegates whom Senator McCarthy was trying to persuade had long since been committed by the primary victories and other assiduous traveling, visiting and negotiating by Senator Kennedy. There may be nothing wrong in this. On the contrary, whereas Senator Kennedy doubtless lacks—at least now—some qualities Governor Stevenson has (charism and an articulation of the deepest national ideas), he may already have some qualities Governor Stevenson did not always exhibit (direct, uncomplicated, objective executive force).

What purposes will guide and restrain this seeking of power? The ideas that Senator Kennedy selects from those available to a Democrat are good ones; his acceptance speech lacked Stevenson's eloquence, but the main points—especially that he cannot promise security, and that he must demand higher taxes—were clear and good. Many of his speeches have been good: the ones on the strong

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Presidency to the National Press Club and on the "religious issue" to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, for example.

Beyond that, Kennedy has the best connections with, and makes excellent use of the thinking that has been going on within the Democratic Party: the Finletter group before 1956; the groups under the Democratic Advisory Council since 1956, and in intellectual circles adjacent to it. This thinking showed itself in the strong Democratic platform, which exhibited more thought and work than is usually characteristic of such documents. It did so not only in the widely discussed and politically most potent section—the strong civil rights plank—but in the foreign and economic policy sections as well. The Galbraith-Lippmann-Schlesinger thesis, for example, that we Americans have private luxury but comparative public penury, appeared throughout the convention from the keynote speech on and in the platform, which was indeed shaped in part by Kennedy men.

Of course other possibilities remain open, but one result of the Democratic Convention may be that the 1960's will see a confluence of the thinking that has been going on among the eggheads Stevenson led in the 1950's with the broad sources of party support—which Kennedy has been able very effectively to enlist. And as Governor Stevenson himself said in a memorable moment eight years ago, "*who leads us is less important than what leads us—what convictions, what courage, what faith. . .*"

W. L. M.

NOT BY ARMS ALONE

DR. SAM FRANKLIN'S splendid first-hand account in this issue of Japanese Christian sentiment regarding military security and neutralism should serve as a vivid reminder that there are many vantage points from which to view the East-West struggle.

It is cheap satisfaction to point out that the Japanese are unrealistic. Perhaps they are mistaken to believe they can remain free without the protection afforded by at least minimal armaments. However, we are equally unrealistic in our easy assumptions about military security, for it is on this frail foundation that we set our greatest hope in the struggle with communism. Military power is important, and we join those who criticize the nation's present limited military posture. But we think it is even more essential that U.S. policy

demonstrate our determination to meet more fully than the Communists the most basic challenge of the underdeveloped nations, whether in Latin America, Asia or Africa—to assist them by peaceful, democratic means to develop their capacities and to secure economic justice. These nations will never be convinced of our sincerity until we demonstrate that we are as concerned about their economic security as about their military security.

There is nothing new or novel in this assessment of the present need, but there is an increased urgency that we give it more attention. This is borne out not only by the recent events in Japan, but also by developments in Korea and Cuba.

For too many years we have supported decadent dictatorships just because they opposed communism. *The New Republic* reported recently that "Between 1952 and 1959 a total of \$457 million in military aid was given to 19 American 'republics,' including the dictatorships of Odria, Perez Jimenez, Rojas Pinilla, Batista and Trujillo." Democratic administrations have been similarly guilty.

Our good fortune in not being associated in the Korean mind with the Rhee police state, which we supported, is indeed remarkable, and it is not likely to be repeated elsewhere. The trend of the future may be exemplified by Fidel Castro in Cuba more than by our lucky escape in Korea. Whatever may rightly be charged against Castro, and there is much, we must remember that we supported the bloody Batista regime with both military advisers and equipment, which is reason enough for any new Cuban government to show resentment towards the U.S. Furthermore, we would likely be willing even now to overlook many of Castro's faults if one were not his blatant anti-Americanism.

We must recognize that few of our choices offer clear-cut alternatives between the forces of light and darkness. Our position of world leadership has thrust us into many tough situations that provide for no easy solution; therefore, our self-criticism must be within the limits of the possible.

Nevertheless, to project an essentially military image that threatens our allies' well-being and gives slight indication of concern for the aspirations of the underdeveloped and generally neutral nations is a great liability. Any new administration must take this problem seriously. And all who vote in November are under a heavy burden of responsibility to determine which party and candidate is most likely to give positive leadership in this area.

W. H. C.

THE YOUNGER GENERATION

LET'S RUN the risk of a swift generalization and say that the time has come to change our diagnosis of what is wrong with the young. We have rested a little too long with our standard description of youth as devoid of idealism, causeless, nihilistic and "beat." Strong evidence to the contrary has been popping up in various and unrelated places recently, as young people have been taking the leadership in social criticism, protest and dissent.

The most obvious signals of this change of mood have been, of course, the movements of students and young people in Korea, Turkey and Japan. Perhaps these demonstrations were far away and special and, therefore, irrelevant to our generalization. The fact remains that prophetic sounds are being heard, some of them from close at hand.

Item: The lunch counter demonstrations in the South were germinated in a dormitory room of a college campus in Greensboro, N.C.

Item: A group of students in the Paramus (N.J.) High School circulated a letter of protest during a recent Civil Defense drill in that area.

Item: The Board of Education of the City of New York requires each graduating senior in its schools to sign an oath of allegiance to the Federal and state constitutions before it will certify his graduation with a diploma. In April a 16-year-old

senior in a Long Island high school, one Edward Jahn, refused to sign on grounds that the action was being coerced. Antioch College admitted him without the diploma.

Item: Taking their cue from Jahn, six seniors at the Bronx High School of Science signed the oaths "under protest," and three others, one of them a Merit Scholar, refused to sign. Subsequently the Board of Education relented in these cases.

Item: More recently, at an awards ceremony of another Long Island high school, a senior named Stephen Bayne was four times called for recognitions honoring him in four areas of school achievement. When he was called the fifth time to receive an American Legion citizenship award, he rose and said: "I refuse to accept an award from an organization whose policies I can't respect."

The school apologized to the Legion. Young Bayne was stripped of two of the awards that he had already won. When they were passed along to two other seniors, those seniors refused to accept them. The only undisturbed party to the skirmish seemed to be Harvard University, which had already admitted Bayne.

What's got into the kids? Pushing non-segregation at lunch counters, cleaning up exclusionist policies in their fraternities, defying loyalty oaths and CD drillmasters, disagreeing with the policies of the American Legion—maybe they have more sense than their elders.

R. T. B.

U.S.-Japanese Treaty: Dilemma for Christians

SAM H. FRANKLIN

PROTESTANT CHRISTIANS of Japan are deeply involved in the crisis that has arisen out of the revision of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. The great majority of Japanese Christians who have expressed themselves on the issue have been anti-Kishi and anti-treaty. While their criticism points up weaknesses in the treaty that must be taken with the utmost seriousness, the way their opposition has been carried out, especially its "united front" character, has placed them in a very vulnerable position from which it will be difficult to extricate themselves. A preliminary assessment of the situation reveals the paramount need that American Christians not only gain a clear understanding of their Japanese brothers' approach

to the problem, but also that they cooperate in a constructive program for the immediate future.

For many Japanese students and other Christians, hoarse and footsore after participation in the *demos* which reached a climax on the night of June 18 (one minister in his fifties stated in a sermon that the zig-zags of the previous day's demonstration had been too much for him), the next responsibility was to explain their actions to Christian friends in America. Various statements and documents, some of them quite detailed, are being sent to Christian journals, institutions and individuals. In all of these expressions American Christians will sense the spirit of unity in the community of faith, out of which springs the desire to make themselves understood.

The influence of Christians in the present crisis

Dr. Franklin teaches Christian Social Ethics at the Tokyo Union Theological Seminary. He is unusually qualified to write out of his experience of Japan both before and after World War II.

has been disproportionate to their small numbers. It is significant that at the time when feeling about the approaching visit of President Eisenhower was running highest, the *Asahi*, Japan's greatest newspaper with a circulation of over five million, suggested editorially that Christians use their influence to persuade the President not to come.

By a strange irony, Christian participation was emphasized in another way. When Christian groups, out of the tens of thousands of demonstrators on June 17, were presenting their petitions against the Kishi cabinet and the treaty to members of the Diet, a respected Christian member of the Socialist Party, Mr. Jotaro Kawakami, was dealt a knife wound by a malcontent who had resolved to kill some Socialist leader. It is also reported that the one fatality among the demonstrators, Miss Michiko Kamba, a student of Tokyo University, while not a Christian, had attended Christian Sunday school and was a reader of the Bible.

"A Fatal Turning Point"

Any attempt at interpretation of this Christian social action must go beyond polite assurances that for the Christians who participated it was neither pro-Communist nor anti-American. American Christians must face up to the criticism of Christian-supported American policy implied in the Japanese action. Japanese Christians must rise above stereotyped emotional reactions and consider American misgivings as to their position. Such a process may bring home some unpalatable facts to each group, but nothing less becomes those who are members of the Mystical Body and jointly dependent on the leading of the Holy Spirit.

The following attempt at analysis and suggestion is made conscious of the limitations that rest upon any Western Christian who undertakes it, but in the hope that it may help to open the way for mutual heart searching and an honest exchange of insight. With this in view I shall attempt to answer four questions regarding the Christian role in the treaty crisis.

First, what is the basic Japanese motivation back of mass meetings, marches, declarations, speeches and articles that have abounded since the treaty revision became an issue? American Christians may have difficulty in finding an answer to this question despite careful study of explanations given by Japanese Christians. Much has been said about the questionable parliamentary maneuvers of Prime Minister Kishi and his arrogant disregard of anti-treaty sentiment in the Diet and among the peo-

ple generally. These criticisms are valid, but it was probably not undemocratic procedure as such, but undemocratic procedure as it facilitated the ratification of the revised treaty that disturbed many Japanese Christians. Had the Kishi cabinet employed the same tactics in connection with some totally different domestic issue it is questionable if the Christian conscience would have been equally aroused.

It goes without saying that the opposition to the Eisenhower visit on the part of Christians had nothing to do with anti-Americanism, but only with the visit as a prop to the Kishi regime. The point should not be missed that if a dissolution of the Diet could have been forced by the Lower House even after the ratification of the treaty on May 19, the process of automatic ratification by the Upper House after the lapse of a month would have been prevented. Hence it was to the great interest of all opponents of the treaty to dissolve the Diet before the month had expired. The answer then is simple: Christians participated in the demonstrations primarily because of opposition to the treaty itself.

This opposition has a long history. In January 1954, I attended a three-day meeting of about 100 ministers, Christian business and professional men, and Christian political leaders, including ex-Prime Minister Katayama and members of the Upper and Lower Houses. One of its main concerns was the "administrative agreement" drawn up ancillary to the first security treaty. Among those present not a voice in favor of the agreement was to be heard. I reported to American Christians at the time: "On the contrary, it was viewed by many as an attempt of American capitalism to strengthen itself at home and at the same time to increase its hold on the Japanese economy . . . it was seen to be a fatal turning point for Japan away from democracy and back toward militarism."

A year ago the United Church of Christ in Japan (*Kyodan*) requested a group of social scientists, ministers and others belonging to the Institute on the Mission of the Church to study the problem of the revision of the security treaty. Last December this body published what is probably the most detailed expression of the Christian attitude toward the treaty made to date, a forty-eight page booklet containing a joint declaration and five articles by individual writers dealing with various aspects of the problem. The declaration denounced the new treaty as a backward step and expressed the hope that as the Church is united in faith in our Lord so may it likewise be united in its stand on this

issue. Separate copies were printed in large type for posting and were sent to many *Kyodan* churches.

On January 15, 1960 a mass meeting of Christians opposed to the treaty was held in Tokyo, attended by more than 1,000 persons. It is interesting that Mr. Kaoru Yasui, the non-Christian head of an influential secular organization to oppose nuclear weapons and himself often accused of strong pro-Communist leanings, was asked to bring greetings. After an hour of speech-making the group formed a procession and, singing hymns and flourishing banners with anti-treaty slogans, marched down some of the main streets of Tokyo. A similar well-attended meeting and demonstration was held in May.

As the crisis deepened in May and June, Christian protests increased. Some ninety members of the staff and faculty of the International Christian University published an appeal to the Prime Minister and to President Eisenhower deploring interference with democratic procedures and urging that the "original intention" of the Japanese peace Constitution be upheld. On June 10 a letter signed by a large number of faculty members of five Christian universities and colleges in Tokyo requested a postponement of the President's visit because it would be misconstrued as involvement in Japanese politics. On June 16 there was a mass demonstration by faculty and students from Christian schools in which 3,000 were said to have taken part.

The Sunday before the scheduled visit of the President an all-night outdoor Christian prayer meeting was held to pray for peace and disarmament. It was covered by TV, radio and press representatives, and a picture of it appeared on the front page of the *Asahi Evening News*. It must be emphasized that these and other groups did not speak for the Church as a whole and that a majority of the Christians, even in the Tokyo area, did not express themselves on the treaty in any way. However, there was enough proclamation and action on the part of Christian groups and individuals to associate Christianity with the anti-treaty, anti-Kishi movement in the public mind.

Grounds for Opposition

The second question asks: What, then, are the main grounds of this opposition, which has evoked the greatest degree of Christian social action in Japanese history? In general the arguments used are those employed by Socialists, labor unions and others. They may be summarized as follows:

(1) The Constitutional issue. Although in Ar-

ticle III of the treaty it is stated that the self-help and mutual aid called for will be subject to Constitutional provisions, it is widely held that in spirit the treaty violates Article Nine of the Constitution, which renounces war as a means of settling international disputes and states that land, sea and air forces will never be maintained.

(2) The issue of militarization. Prof. Iizaka in the booklet referred to above declares that Article III places the burden of rearmament upon Japan. For many Japanese the strengthening of the military power of the State is inseparably associated with fascist and Rightist repression. It is reported that there are now twenty-three ultra-nationalist groups with some 30,000 members. In ministers' groups it has been stated that the new treaty means the revival of military conscription.

(3) Provocation of neighboring countries. It is widely charged that Russia and Red China are made hypothetical enemies in the treaty. Many Christians refer to wrongs committed by Japanese soldiers in China during World War II and point out that this makes it doubly desirable that Japan seek China's friendship now.

(4) The ambiguity of the treaty and its subsidiary agreements. Christian scholars join with others in pointing out the vagueness of the terms "Far East," "prior consultation," etc.

(5) The economic issue. Christian arguments strongly stress the tragedy of further investment in armament when social welfare services are so underdeveloped and perhaps one-tenth of the population (including families on relief and borderline cases) face desperate poverty. Prof. Mikio Sumiya of Tokyo University, in the booklet referred to, shows that the personnel of Japan's self-defense force increased from 75,000 in 1950 to 242,000 in 1958 and that in 1959 the cost to Japan was \$377,777,000. He notes that to train one pilot costs about \$85,000. (The level of monthly assistance for totally destitute adults in Japan is about \$10 or less.) There is also widespread fear that the economy will be built increasingly upon the armament industry. Prof. Sumiya concludes his analysis with the prediction that the Japanese will certainly become the "merchants of death" of East Asia under the new treaty. Many Christian statements say that it would undoubtedly increase Japan's prosperity but that Christians must be prepared to suffer privation for principles.

(6) The long term of the treaty. The year required to give notice of termination after the expiration of the ten-year term makes eleven years. Christians and others opposing the treaty have

stated most strongly that in a day when the whole international situation changes so rapidly, this is far too long for Japan to be committed to a military pact.

To these specific criticisms two other facts must be added. One is in answer to the question foreigners often ask, namely, why the opposition to the revised pact is so great when even its critics admit that it is an improvement on the first treaty. This is because the first treaty was regarded as having been forced on Japan as a condition of the peace treaty and the ending of the Occupation. Opponents were biding their time to oppose it. The revision fully recognizes Japan's independence and sovereignty, but it is regarded as binding the nation in a way that the first treaty did not.

The second fact is the general shock received by the Japanese from the U-2 incident. As is well known in America, it was revealed by a dramatic accident in Japan last year that the U.S. Government is basing "weather reconnaissance" planes of this type here. Americans can hardly imagine the edge this has given to Malinovsky's threat of nuclear countermeasures against any country where planes violating Communist air space are based. Papers reported that some of the inhabitants in the neighborhood of a base that reportedly harbors these planes were evacuating the locality. Recently the weekly magazine *Gendai* carried an imaginative account of Soviet retaliation for a U-2 flight from Atsugi Air Base. According to the story, in twelve minutes time from its discovery over Russian territory mushroom clouds appear over Japan's five main cities.

Naïveté on Communism

Our third question is: What are the main weaknesses of the position of Japanese Christians who oppose the treaty? One weakness is that it holds little awareness of the threat of communism to Japan, from within or from outside. Prof. Iizaka criticizes America for regarding communism as a "devil's child" and for seeking only to crusade against it. He says that Chinese action in Tibet does not add up to aggression and that the many visitors from Japan to Communist China, including Christians, feel there is no reason to fear Chinese aggression.

Another prominent Christian scholar, Prof. Makoto Saito of the Department of Law of Tokyo University, declares in *Fukuin to Sekai* that the protection of democracy and opposition to the treaty are but two aspects of the same thing. He

says that Japan will become exactly like Korea under Syngman Rhee if the treaty becomes law. He calls for the overthrow of the Kishi cabinet in order to prevent the "Koreanizing" of Japan.

Secondly, there is a similar general unawareness among Christians of how the recent disorders have been used to serve the purposes of communism. Communist Party members, incidentally, have increased by about 10,000 in the past year, and the party is now larger than either branch of the recently divided Socialist Party. It seems undeniable that the most massive and violent demonstrations were spearheaded by fanatical Leftists, themselves divided into "Trotskyites" and Communists. A leaflet picked up on the street following a demonstration is typical of the extreme group's outlook. From a Marxist study group in Hosei University in Tokyo, it calls for a "show of force by the proletariat," a twenty-four hour strike that will paralyze power centers and "strike fear into the bottom of the hearts of the bourgeoisie." The whole phraseology is extreme and rabid.

The situation that developed following Miss Kamba's death is another instance in point. Although the first medical report indicated she was probably crushed or trampled to death, charges of extreme barbarism against the police have been made. To those who have seen Communist tactics in the West the developments follow a suspiciously familiar pattern. Many Christians are strangely untroubled about their partners in the demonstrations. A group of Christian students states that on the night of June 15 the police were provocative (according to the newspapers 536 policemen were injured that night) and that the violent action of the *Zengakuren* (the Left-wing student group) was unavoidable.

One of the most thoughtful and balanced statements prepared by Christians to explain the crisis to their brethren in the U.S. admits that "extremist elements" sought to use the social unrest for their own ends but declares that the common bond uniting Christians to other demonstrators was opposition to war, rearmament and the undemocratic behavior of the Government. This statement closes with the fervent prayer that Japan may be spared the "blind anti-Communist despotism" that Korea experienced!

Over against this easy acceptance of the united front we may place a statement from Mrs. Shizue Kato, a member of the Upper House for ten years. Although belonging to the Socialist Party, she was shocked by the course events took and declared: "The Communists, with the extremely active sup-

port of Red China and the Soviet Union, have tried to destroy the Government by forming a powerful popular front." An outstanding exception to the tendency among Christians that I have described is found in a public statement made by President Hichiro Yuasa of the International Christian University, who charged: "The International Communists expertly exploited the unpopularity of the Kishi Government, confused real issues, and blinded sincere, well-meaning, peace-minded students and citizens including Christians."

A third weakness of the Christian position is the vague concept of the alternative to the treaty. Some type of neutralism is often advocated, occasionally with the claim that spiritual force alone could enable Japan to resist communism. Frequently there is the assumption that with or without the treaty Japan will continue to be the recipient of American protection.

Insights of Christian Faith Untapped

A fourth weakness is a large degree of failure to relate the deep insights of Christian faith positively and negatively to the present situation. By and large, there is relatively little theological point of reference in Christian statements and articles on the treaty. Prof. Noda of Tokyo University in an article in the popular magazine *Sekai*, "A Japanese Christian Appeals to the Good Sense of America," does not go much beyond a plea that Americans discard their prejudice and distrust toward Russia. (He cites Jesus' attitude toward the Samaritans.) There is little tendency among these Christians to subject the easy identification of opposition to the treaty with the promotion of peace to any kind of theological criticism. The theological grounds for maintaining a balance of power are seldom mentioned.

It is significant that a thoughtful young minister, who in seminary days was under strong Left-wing influence, recently stated apropos of the anti-treaty demonstrations that what the Christians in Japan need is a deeper understanding of the doctrine of sin. This is rather ironical in view of the prominence of this subject in Japanese theology and preaching, but it does fairly raise the question of whether the insights of Karl Barth, great and valuable as they have been in stimulating and renewing the Japanese Church, equip Japanese ministers adequately for the day-by-day decisions of Christian social witness. The question becomes stronger when one senses a certain reaction of cynicism and resignation now that the treaty has

been ratified. This takes expression in statements that the next election will be corrupt, that the courts cannot be depended upon, and that there is now nothing that Christians can do. Faith has more to offer in safeguarding against illusions on the one hand, and in providing direction and dynamic in the face of frustration on the other, than many Japanese Christians have discovered.

Role of American Christians

Our fourth question is: What can American Christians do, aside from prayer and a general effort to understand the situation, to help their Japanese brothers in the present crisis? (1) They can resist, as Christians and as citizens, all efforts toward economic retaliation. The equivalent in the American Church of the infamous proposal to "turn snake lines into bread lines" through boycott would be to reduce appropriations for Christian work in Japan. Such action would play directly into the hands of those who charge that missions are cultural imperialism.

(2) Facilitate the exchange of ideas and convictions on the treaty issue and its aftermath between Christians of the two countries. The desire for this is expressed with great frequency among those most concerned with the problem here. It would be most helpful if a few leaders from the American Church could sit down with representative leaders of Christian social thought in Japan (not necessarily the Japanese presently most active in ecumenical circles) and attempt to formulate policies that Christians of both countries can support.

(3) Under certain conditions, support a demand for the re-negotiation of the security treaty revision. Japanese Christian social action against the treaty now stands at a critical turning point. It has been identified with political activity whose over-all effect was to weaken democracy rather than to strengthen it. If Christians now reject the counsels both of utopianism and of despair and strive by democratic methods to get a nation-wide expression of attitude on the revised treaty through a special referendum or by means of the general election that will in all probability occur this year, it may be made clear that a majority of the voters are clearly opposed to the treaty in its present form. In that case Japanese Christians should advocate a request to the U.S. Government, regardless of the legalities of the situation, to re-open negotiations in the hope of ironing out present difficulties, and *they should have the support of American Christians for this request.*

Certain relatively small changes and clarifications, together with a shortening of the term of

the treaty, especially if made in a context other than that of the highhandedness of the Kishi cabinet, might render it acceptable to many of the non-extremists who have opposed it, and Japanese democracy, functioning in this way, might be strengthened in the process. American Christians cannot ignore such an expression of the majority of the Japanese, when it is unconcerned by violence and general strikes. We dare not absolutize our idea of what is good for the Japanese nation in a matter so ambiguous as that of a military alliance.

(4) Maintain humility and openness of mind. Immediately after the Hagerty incident a group of seminary students drafted a letter of apology to the American Ambassador. Similar expressions regarding this incident and the postponement of the President's visit have been frequent. Have the Japanese heard any expression of American Christian regret over the U-2 incident and its possible bearing on the collapse of the Summit Conference? Are American Christians themselves exhibiting perseverance amid frustration in their efforts to build even footbridges over the East-West chasm? Is the same realism we would like our Japanese brothers to show regarding international issues being manifested by us as we deal with such matters as China's exclusion from the UN?

The Apostle tells us that if we live by the Spirit (as Christians in both countries do) we should walk by the Spirit. To walk by the Spirit does not mean unanimity of opinion. It does mean dealing with our differences in a way that shows that membership in the Household of Faith takes precedence over all other earthly ties.

CORRESPONDENCE

The Candidate's Religion: Another View

TO THE EDITORS: The letter signed by Robert Lekachman, printed by you in the May 30 issue ("The Candidates' Religion: A Secular View"), is really shocking in its failure to deal with practical problems objectively. Two weaknesses are particularly glaring.

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(1) The correspondent, in dealing with the question of Mr. Kennedy's Roman Catholicism, makes no reference at all to Vatican pronouncements which, if taken seriously, are bound to limit an occupant of high office. Of course, Mr. Kennedy, if elected, may neglect official doctrine, but it is not intellectually honest to act as though such doctrines do not exist.

(2) The correspondent is manifestly unfair also in his reference to Richard Nixon, in the Vice President's expressed conviction that while particular church membership is by no means a qualification for high leadership, a deep faith is.

The correspondent tries to act as though this were an unconstitutional demand for a "religious test" when it is nothing of the kind. Mr. Lekachman is merely betraying his secularist presuppositions. What the Vice President had in mind, as anyone not blinded by partisan consideration would see, is the same as that said so well by Alexis de Tocqueville more than a hundred years ago, when he saw that the roots of American democracy really do go down into the biblical faith. The well known words are:

For my own part, I doubt whether man can ever support at the same time complete religious independence and entire political freedom. And I am inclined to think that, if faith be wanting in him, he must be subject; and if he be free he must believe.

D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD
Richmond, Ind.

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CONTENTS

U.S.-JAPANESE TREATY: DILEMMA FOR CHRISTIANS
SAM H. FRANKLIN